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I
INTRODUCTION
In its most common usage, the term "responsible" connotes blame or
obligation. A statement that one is responsible for an act that has already
happened, particularly if it is an act of which most people would disapprove,
often means that the actor is blameworthy. A statement that one is
responsible for future conduct often means that the actor incurs an obligation
to behave in a certain way and that if the obligation is not met, blame will
ultimately follow. The attribution of responsibility to an individual for a given
act implies that the individual had the capacity to choose to perform or not
perform that act. Only those who appear able to choose are found
blameworthy or are held to their obligations.'
Social systems are strengthened by holding people responsible for their
conduct. The legal system, for example, obligates citizens to behave in ways
that minimize the risk of social harm. Citizens know that they will be held
responsible, that is, blamed, and perhaps subjected to punitive sanctions if
they do not behave in such ways. This knowledge presumably leads to law-
abiding behavior. Every civilized society has also developed mechanisms for
excusing from legal blame or obligation those who appear unable to exercise
choice. In the criminal law excuses are based upon psychological or physical
incapacities that diminish the actor's knowledge of the nature and
consequences of socially proscribed acts or upon some unusual
environmental influence (such as duress) that was present at the time such
acts occurred.2
People may also be held responsible or excused for conduct that is not
legally proscribed. In most social relationships, sanctions are imposed to
designate blame or to hold people to obligations, but such relationships also
allow for excusing from responsibility those who appear incapable of choice.3
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1. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 460 (1960).
2. See generally D. HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983).
3. C. SNYDER, R. HIGGINS & R. STUCKY, EXCUSES: MASQUERADES IN SEARCH OF GRACE 4 (1983).
The authors provide this useful definition of excuses in interpersonal processes: "Excuses are
explanations or actions that lessen the negative implications of an actor's performance, thereby
maintaining a positive image for oneself and others."
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the process of blaming and
excusing in criminal law can be better understood by examining an excuse-
giving system outside of the field of law, namely the system for treating
medical patients. This system is important in its own right and I will describe
why the process of assessing the responsibility of patients is an integral part of
medical treatment. My primary reason for focusing upon excuse-giving in
medicine, however, is that this process is similar to the process of excuse-
giving in law, and yet sufficiently different so as to provide new insights into
alternative approaches to criminal justice.
II
THE PURPOSE OF BLAME OR EXCUSE IN LAW AND MEDICINE
In the criminal law the process of invoking responsibility is ordinarily
associated with a societal response involving punishment. This response
fulfills the retributive function of the criminal law. There are four social
purposes associated with the idea of retribution. First, societal punishment
prevents private vengeance. Presumably, if society did not punish the
perpetrators of criminal acts, victims might respond by creating new harms.
Second, punishment teaches society the values of law and the importance of
obeying the law. The public rejection, condemnation, or censure of the
offender by society is a powerful lesson to all citizens. Third, punishment of
the guilty clearly delineates responsibility for whatever wrong has occurred.
Only the offender is guilty; all others are absolved of blame for the offender's
act. Fourth, punishment seems to serve a powerful moral or emotional need
for many members of the community. 4 It is often argued that punishment
must be imposed on those who have harmed society simply because they
deserve it. This concept of "just desert" is often presumed to reside in a
natural and immutable human need for justice.5
In the process of blaming and punishing, the criminal justice system also
serves nonretributive and clearly utilitarian needs of the society and the
offender. Punishment may deter the offender from subsequent criminal acts.
The example of his punishment may also deter others. Punishment may also
play a significant role in helping the offender see the error of his ways, and
thus contribute to his ultimate reformation. Finally, some forms of
punishment, such as imprisonment, also provide society with protection from
the possibility that the criminal will offend again.
It is possible to accomplish the more utilitarian functions of the criminal
justice system (specific and general deterrence, rehabilitation, and restraint)
without holding the offender blameworthy and responsible. With the
exception of those acquitted by reason of insanity, however, this separation of
responsibility from punishment does not occur. In dealing with the majority
of offenders, the criminal justice system mixes retributive and utilitarian
4. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 5 (1983).
5. E. VAN DEN HAG &J. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 55 (1983).
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purposes.6 The ascription of responsibility and blame leads to some type of
retribution. Such retribution, however, is also calibrated to serve classical
utilitarian goals so that the degree, the nature, and the locus of punishment
are also determined by concern for deterrence, rehabilitation, or restraint.
Excuses from criminal responsibility are intended to promote the fairness
of the judicial process by sparing from punishment those who lack the
capacity to refrain from illegal conduct. In criminal law, excuses are rare.
Once it is proven that an offender has committed a criminal act, he is at risk of
punishment unless there is additional evidence that he honestly and
reasonably believed he was performing a legal act (mistake of fact), he was
forced into committing the act (duress), or he was insane at the time of the
crime. 7
Medicine structures the process of ascribing responsibility to protect those
who are disabled or to assist patients' recovery by excusing them from the
stresses of blame or obligation. Physicians must evaluate a great deal of
deviant and substandard conduct (failure to meet obligations) and determine
if it is excusable. Because such behavior is not proscribed by law, the
consequences of a decision not to excuse the conduct do not include criminal
punishment. If it is not excusable, the patient may still be subject to the
aversive consequences of blame (by self, family, friends, employers, or the
community) or be required to meet future obligations. Excuses are most
likely to be provided when physicians see disabilities related to substandard or
deviant conduct as a form of illness.8 Because illness is so ubiquitous and is
believed to influence so many varieties of behavior, medical excuses are very
common. Physicians do not usually allow ascription of responsibility for
substandard or deviant conduct until they have made exhaustive efforts to
rule out the existence of an excusable illness.
When doctors make decisions to withhold or grant excuses, there is little
or no mixing of retributive and utilitarian purposes. Physicians are rarely
concerned with the question whether patients deserve excuses. Even when
physicians withhold excuses, they do not intend to punish. The patient may
perceive the consequences of not being excused as aversive, but the
physician's intent is always to be helpful to the patient.
The physician's practices with regard to excuse-giving may also serve
social purposes. Most societies have a strong interest in having as many
citizens as possible meet their obligations. By failing to excuse individuals
who claim to be sick, the physician encourages them to perform better.
Excusing sick people from obligations such as work or military service has
different social consequences. It may provide expanded opportunities or
greater obligations for those who are not disabled. 9
6. N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 197 (1982).
7. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 29 (1968).
8. T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 13-15 (1963).
9. D. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 5 (1984).
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III
THE POWER OF THE MEDICAL EXCUSE
Most people, including doctors, do not look upon medical practice as a
system that provides excuses from blame or obligation. The importance of
excuse-giving can be illustrated, however, by considering the following, not
uncommon, situation.
Several years ago I developed symptoms of low grade fever and extreme
fatigue. I went to work each day for about two weeks but accomplished little.
I worried about my condition and was especially concerned about preparing
and delivering a major speech I was supposed to give in just a few days. When
I finally realized that I was getting very little done, I reluctantly went to see my
doctor. After performing a brief examination and doing blood tests, he
informed me that I had a severe case of infectious mononucleosis with
hepatitis. He told me that it was imperative that I quit trying to work and that
I stay in bed for at least two weeks. My response to his diagnosis and
recommendation was one of relief. I no longer blamed myself for my poor
performance during the previous two weeks. I knew that if others were critical
of my performance, my illness would blunt any negative feelings they might
have been developing towards me. I was also excused from the obligation of
continuing work. It then became possible for me not to meet my obligation to
give my speech and still retain integrity. When I called the sponsors of the
speech and my employers and told them about my illness, they were
sympathetic and understanding. They told me to go to bed and wished me a
speedy recovery. The medical excuse in this case was powerful and complete.
What would have happened if the doctor had detected no disease? I then
would have had no honorable means of avoiding my obligations even if I felt
incapable of meeting them. I would, in fact, have been exposed to substantial
aversive consequences from several sources. Those who were depending on
me for work or for my presentation would have been seriously troubled by my
response. My credibility would have been damaged and if I behaved in a
similar manner often enough my livelihood eventually might have been
threatened. My family certainly would have had difficulty understanding why
I was failing to meet my obligations. They would have blamed me for having
spent the previous two weeks doing nothing. It is likely that my physician
would also have treated me less indulgently. Absent the finding of physical
disease, he probably would have viewed my difficulty in meeting obligations as
either a manifestation of a mild emotional disorder or as laziness. In either
case, my behavior would have been judged as being much more subject to my
own control, less "respectable," and perhaps blameworthy. Most important,
if I had not been excused, I would have inflicted substantial punishments
upon myself. If I had not been really sick but had still been perceiving myself
as unable to meet my obligations, I would have believed my symptoms were
an aspect of malingering or "all in my head." (It should be apparent that for a
patient who went to the doctor with symptoms such as mine, the worst news
that could be expected would be a diagnosis of severe and perhaps fatal
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malady. The next worst news, however, would be a diagnosis of no malady.
The message "your health is excellent" is rarely a welcome response for the
patient who feels incapacitated.)
The above case illustrates a process of blaming and excusing that is a
regular part of medical practice. The key mechanism in this process is that the
physician's failure to excuse results in blame or obligation for the patient.
Sometimes, as in my case, the consequences of the physician's decision may
not be "earth-shaking." Often, however, when physicians have to make
decisions as to whether people will be viewed as disabled for long periods of
time, or when financial remuneration depends on the physician's opinion as to
the degree of disability, the decision whether to excuse may have a profound
influence upon the patient and society.' 0 Considering the amount of wages,
insurance payments, and other monetary awards it determines, the medical
excuse-giving process influences the distribution of billions of dollars
annually. " I
Some decisions to excuse the patient are easy to make. In the example
given above in which there was a moderately severe biological illness
associated with clear physical signs (fever) and definitive laboratory tests, the
physician did not hesitate to excuse. Patients with mononucleosis and
hepatitis are obviously disabled and need rest. Suppose, however, that after
four weeks of bed rest my fever had gone down and my liver function tests
had returned to normal but I still remained lethargic and still felt unable to
work. At this point the physician's decision as to whether I should remain in
bed and continue to be excused from obligations would have been much more
difficult. Even if he gave me the benefit of the doubt and assumed that I was
suffering from some of the residual effects of mononucleosis, he would have
been concerned about whether the continuation of excuse-giving would be in
the best interest of myself or my employers. If a longer period, say two
months, had passed and I still complained of symptoms and claimed to be
unable to return to work, the inclination of the physician to deny an excuse
would have been much greater. He might have gently suggested that though I
had been very sick it was time for me to resume my obligations, even if I found
such action painful. He might have labeled my sedentary behavior a
manifestation of some type of psychological illness. Such a tactic, as I will
argue in a later section, would have provided me with a relatively fragile
excuse, certainly not as powerful as an excuse of physical illness. Finally, he
might have assumed I was malingering. It should be clear that anything less
than a full excuse would have imposed aversive consequences upon me and
would have complicated my relationship with my doctor.
10. See id. at 113. Theoretically, of course, physicians who evaluate patients in situations where
compensation is at stake are only supposed to describe impairment to a judicial agency that is
ultimately responsible for determining disability. In practice, the physicians' recommendations
usually determine the final decision.
1I. R. BERKHAUSER & R. HAVEMAN, DISABILITY AND WORK: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC
POLICY 30, 37-38 (1982).
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In medical practice, the easy decisions, such as whether to excuse an
acutely distressed patient, are less common than the difficult decisions that
arise when distress is moderate and dysfunction is chronic. Often the degree
of impairment the physician discovers does not explain the patient's
substandard or deviant conduct. Yet, the patient may insist upon being
excused and the physician may be under great pressure from the patient, his
family, or his employers to provide an excuse. Dealing with this situation is
one of the more ungratifying aspects of medical practice.
IV
NEW TRENDS THAT EXACERBATE THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA
A number of social and scientific trends make physicians' decisions
regarding excuse-giving even more difficult. Some trends direct physicians to
hold their patients more responsible for illness behavior; others direct them
to hold them less responsible. The trend towards greater responsibility is in
large part fueled by a new interest in promoting health and preventing disease
by changing people's behavior.' 2 Traditionally, disease has been viewed as an
affliction for which one is not responsible.' 3 This assumption is now being
questioned. According to one leader in the field of public health, "the idea of
a 'right' to health (guaranteed by government) should be replaced by the idea
of an individual's moral obligation to preserve one's own health-a public
duty if you will." 14 In the words of a Surgeon General's Report, "[plersonal
lifestyles are responsible for a large share of unnecessary disease and
disability in the United States."' 5
Those looking at the question of health promotion and disease prevention
note that the leading causes of death in the modern era are heart disease,
cancer, stroke, accident, and suicide. 16 These diseases are highly associated
with willful activities such as smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, obesity, and
lack of exercise. There seems little doubt that the people could live longer if
they were able to change some behavior traditionally viewed as within the
realm of choice and under control of the will.17
At the same time that physicians are being urged to hold patients to higher
standards of responsibility, there are new discoveries in biomedical research
that tend to make physicians more hesitant to ascribe responsibility for
substandard or deviant behavior. The relevance of these new findings to the
issue of responsibility is best understood by considering some problems in
12. Matarazzo, Behavorial Health and Behavorial Medicine: Frontiers for a New Health Psychology, 35
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 807 (1980).
13. See generally L. KING, MEDICAL THINKING (1979).
14. J. KNOWLES, The Responsibility of the Individual, in DOING BETrER AND FEELING WORSE: HEALTH
IN THE UNITED STATES 57, 59 (1977).
15. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc., AND WELFARE, HEALTHY PEOPLE:
THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION 142 (1979).
16. See A. ANTONOVSKY, HEALTH, STRESS AND COPING 22 (1979).
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROMOTING HEALTH-PREVENTING DISEASE:
OBJECTIVES FOR THE NATION 61-62, 68-69, 79-80 (1980).
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defining the nature of the disease. In its simplest paradigm, disease can be
said to be present when a biological deficit is demonstrable.' 8 There is not
much problem in ascribing illness to a person with a broken leg or a high
fever. Physicians and society in general have more difficulty in considering
mental disorders as illnesses. Mental disorders are defined primarily on the
basis of substandard or deviant conduct. 19 Often no biological deficit can be
demonstrated. Moreover, mental disorders are also so powerfully influenced
by environmental factors that we think of them as being under control of the
will. 20 In dealing with these disorders physicians have been quite ambivalent.
The mentally disordered are viewed as sick, but they are never treated with
quite the same dignity as the physically ill. They are blamed and excused
inconsistently.
The inconsistent response of physicians toward the mentally ill tends to
diminish once it is possible to demonstrate some kind of biological variation
that is associated with aberrant mental behavior. As evidence accumulates
that major psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, mania, and depression
are characterized by measurable biologic abnormalities, these disorders are
increasingly legitimized as real diseases. 2 1 New evidence has been recently
discovered that even minor psychological deviations are likely to be associated
with biological abnormalities. 22  Scientists have always assumed that
biological changes accompany changes in states of mind. However, the
increasing demonstrability of the existence of these changes is new. New data
that question the distinctions we commonly make between mind and brain
also compound the problem of assessing the responsibility of either the
physically or the mentally ill.23 At the same time that physicians are being
urged to hold patients more accountable for their health, they are tempted to
excuse a greater spectrum of behavior that is demonstrably linked to
biological abnormality.
V
RISK-BENEFIT EVALUATIONS IN THE MEDICAL EXCUSING PROCESS
While physicians obviously would benefit from having more precise
guidelines for ascribing responsibility, research in this area or even efforts to
conceptualize the problem are practically nonexistent. It is likely that many
doctors do not even think about how they decide to grant or withhold
excuses, but instead function intuitively or empirically. This section describes
18. See T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 294-95 (1961).
19. Adams & Haber, The Classification of Abnormal Behavior in COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 3 (H. Adams & P. Sutker, eds. 1984).
20. Halleck, The Assessment of Responsibility in Criminal Law and Psychiatric Practice, in I LAW AND
MENTAL HEALTH: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 193 (1984).
21. P. WENDER & D. KLEIN, MIND, MOOD AND MEDICINE: A GUIDE TO THE NEW BIOPSYCHIATRY
250-52 (1981).
22. See M. REISER, MIND, BRAIN, BODY 202-06 (1984).
23. These data are reviewed and summarized in F. BLOOM, A. LAZERSON & L. HOFSTADTER,
BRAIN, MIND, AND BEHAVIOR 241-71 (1985).
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some of the conceptual issues involved in the medical process of ascribing
responsibility. The material presented here is in large part a statement of
what physicians could or should do and may not accurately describe what they
actually do.
In deciding whether to excuse or to hold a patient responsible for a past or
future act, the physician must evaluate the patient's past, present, or future
capacities actually to perform that act. It is most difficult to decide if an
excuse should be granted when the patient's physical incapacities are not
severe enough to make it impossible for him to perform a particular act but
are severe enough to make that act difficult for him. A patient who has a mild
ankle sprain, for example, may be physically capable of performing as a
postman, but performance is achieved only with considerable pain and with
some risk to his future health. In most medical situations, impairments are
partial and the physician's decision to excuse or not excuse cannot be made by
simply determining the nature of the patient's incapacity. Instead, the
physician must consider how that incapacity will influence a particular
individual who exists in a particular environment. In effect, the physician
must balance the potential benefits for the patient of performing or not
performing a given act against the risk to the patient of performance or
nonperformance. (Physicians may also consider the risks and benefits to
society of performance of nonperformance, but these considerations will not
be discussed here.)
In making risk-benefit evaluations, physicians can only speculate as to how
the patient perceives either the pain or pleasure of various acts. The patient's
view of risks and benefits may be quite different than that of his physician.
Faced with this problem, the physician can make risk-benefit evaluations using
either an objective or a subjective standard. The most tempting option is to
adopt an objective standard and ask how a reasonable or rational person with
the patient's disability might be expected to behave. Although this test has
many precedents in law and is relatively uncomplicated, it is hardly practical in
medicine. People have such different mental and physical capacities that it is
extremely difficult to determine what is a rational or reasonable response to
impairment. Two patients who have an identical injury are likely to feel quite
different levels of pain. Even if reasonableness or rationality is viewed as the
response of "most people" or "the average person," such a standard would
still not deal efficiently with the actual needs of the patient.
It is ultimately more practical to evaluate the patient subjectively by
estimating how the risk-benefit assessment of meeting obligations might
appear to him. This task is exceptionally difficult. Patients probably do not
perceive themselves as making risk-benefit assessments before deciding what
they will do, and it is unlikely that any but a few patients would consider all
risks and benefits. The physician is in the position of trying to decide what a
particular patient would do if fully aware of all risks and benefits and capable
of weighing them rationally. He must then consider granting an excuse when
the subjective risks of a particular type of conduct appear to exceed the
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benefits. Such evaluations are most likely to be useful to the patient and
society when they are based on accurate assessments of the patient's
biological and psychological status.
VI
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE MEDICAL EXCUSING PROCESS
The major problem of an individualized or subjective approach to
assessment is determining how psychological factors such as cognitions or
emotions influence the patient's perception of risks and benefits. A patient
who experiences pain illustrates this relationship very well. We know that the
amount of pain a patient experiences is partially determined by his view of his
disability and his obligations. 24 A patient who views his disability as
incapacitating will experience more pain if he tries to work than a patient who
does not. A patient who does not like his job will probably experience more
pain if he returns to work than a patient who loves his job. The more intense
experience of pain is not simply a matter of malingering. The pain is real and
can be incapacitating. Similar considerations apply to the relationship of
emotion to pain. Depression and pain are highly correlated; depressed
patients are highly susceptible to the experience of pain. 25
The psychological state of the patient must also be viewed in the systems-
oriented context of the doctor-patient interaction. If the physician excuses
the patient, he is perceived quite differently by the patient than if he does not.
The patient's anticipation of the physician's response to his conduct may
initially alert the patient's perception of the risks and benefits of that conduct.
If the patient knows that the physician will disapprove of his not working,
awareness of that attitude creates a new and formidable risk for him if he
wishes to be excused from work.
Patients differ in their responses to the physician's stance on
responsibility. Some patients who would not have met an obligation if the
physician excused them are capable of meeting it without a great deal of
discomfort if the physician withholds an excuse and encourages them to meet
it. Other patients with identical physical capacities do not respond to the
physician's directive. They may fail to meet obligations no matter how
powerfully the physician urges them to do so. Do these differences in
responsiveness mean that patients simply differ in the extent to which they are
compliant or seek the physician's approval? Probably not. Other
psychological differences must be present. One of the most important
psychological variables is the manner in which people think about their own
capacities for action.
24. Sternbach, The Psychologist's Role in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Pain in Patients, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE MANAGEMENT OF PAIN 7 (J. Barger & S. Adrian eds. 1982).
25. Von Knotting, The Experience of Pain in Depressed Patients, in I NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 155
(1975).
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Social learning theorists have taught us that self-referent thoughts mediate
the relationship between knowledge and action.26 The manner in which
people view themselves, and particularly the manner in which they present
messages to themselves that assess and evaluate the meaning events have for
them, will have a significant impact on their behavior. In general, people are
better able to maximize their performance when they are motivated to do so
and view themselves as being capable of doing so. 27 Cognitive processes that
emphasize capability are especially important. High performing individuals
tend to attribute causality for their behavior to internal rather than external
control.28 They have a high sense of self-efficacy or a feeling of being in
control of their destiny.
The views people hold and the messages they give themselves regarding
their illnesses and their capacities to deal with them can be influenced by
others. Patients can learn to feel more responsible for their performance by
interventions, such as counseling, in which they are presented with different
views of causality and self-determination. The physician's decision whether to
excuse marks the initial step in the counseling process. It presents the patient
with a message regarding self-efficacy that impinges upon the cognitive
system he already has with regard to the issue of illness and disability. The
nature of the physician's message will either strengthen or weaken feelings of
self-efficacy. Physicians who wish to maximize the patient's performance will
tend to withhold excuses. This withholding gives the patient the message that
he can control his behavior. The physician's presentation of this message
then increases the likelihood that the patient will improve performance.
Through all of this interaction the physician also must be constantly aware
of the consequences of his actions. The danger of not excusing is that if the
patient perceives himself as unable to perform his obligations, or as having to
pay too high a price for performance, the physician's message may not have
the desired effect. The patient advised to return to work may experience
more pain than he finds tolerable. He may also feel unjustly blamed for
having failed to meet past obligations. At this point he may become less
trusting of his physician, less compliant, and more inclined to sabotage
treatment. He may even escalate his symptomatology and develop new
maladies to prove he is "really" sick. This complication is an extremely
common problem in medical practice. 29 The danger of excuse-giving is that it
fails to take maximum advantage of the aspect of the patient's cognitive
system that emphasizes his capacity to control his own conduct. It may
confirm the patient's most negative views of the risks and benefits of
26. See Schunk & Carbonari, Self-Efficacy Models, in BEHAVIORAL HEALTH: A HANDBOOK OF
HEALTH ENHANCEMENT AND DISEASE PREVENTION 230, 238 (V. Matarazzo, N. Miller, A. Herd, S. Weiss
& S. Weiss eds. 1984).
27. See Bandura, Self-Referent Thought: A Developmental Analysis of Self-Efficacy, in SOCIAL COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS AND POSSIBLE FUTURES 201 (J. Flavell & L. Ross eds. 1981).
28. Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change, 1979 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REV. 84, 191-215.
29. Halleck, The Concept of Responsibility in Psychotherapy, 36 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 292 (1982).
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performances. As a result, the patient may not perform as well as he could
have. He may respond to his poor performance with lowered self-esteem and
increased guilt.
The physician has one other recourse in the excuse-giving process. He
may conclude that some behavior is beyond the patient's capacities but that
there is alternative behavior that is not. A patient who has recently sustained
a back injury, who claims incapacity to return to his job as a manual laborer,
and who takes to his bed may be physically incapable of meeting the
obligations of his regular job. At the same time, he may not be so
incapacitated that he cannot perform sit-down work. Here, the physician has
the opportunity to grade the degree of the patient's responsibility. He might
say, "You are excused from manual labor, but if there is less strenuous work
available, you are obligated to do it." In making a recommendation for a
lesser degree of responsibility, the physician will consider the same
psychological process and risk-benefit evaluation involved in any assessment
of responsibility.
Although the physician has many options in the process of excuse-giving,
there is good reason for him to try to maximize responsibility whenever
possible. Such a stance increases the likelihood that the patient's cognitive
system will be reinforced or restructured in a manner that enhances
performance. The resulting improvement fits in very well with the clinical
experience of psychotherapists, or the common sense experience of parents
trying to raise children. 30 But there is much more involved here than the
patient's or child's fear of punishment. Maximizing demands for
responsibility creates a climate in which desirable change or growth is
possible. Maximizing demands for responsibility gives people the message
that they can control their behavior. When people believe that they are in
control of their behavior and are choosing their actions, they not only
function better, they feel better.31
The above analysis suggests that while the medical system excuses much
more liberally than the legal system, both systems seek to maximize the
responsibility of their clients. There is much more emphasis in the medical
system, however, on maximizing responsibility for utilitarian purposes,
particularly for the purpose of helping the patient.
VII
DISEASES OF THE WILL
I have suggested earlier that physicians confront the most difficult
problems of ascribing responsibility in dealing with mental disorders that are
defined primarily on the basis of deviant behavior.3 2 Included in this group
are disorders such as bulimia, obesity, anorexia nervosa, multiple personality
30. Mazer, The Therapeutic Function of the Belief in WiU, 23 PSYCHIATRY 45 (1960).
31. See generally J. YALOM, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
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disorders, dissociative reactions, personality disorders, alcoholism, gambling,
and sexual deviation. Although it has not been possible, thus far, to
demonstrate a biological etiology for these conditions, patients who are given
these diagnoses usually appear to be suffering. Their behavior does not
ordinarily seem to be self-serving or adaptive. At the same time, however, the
behaviors that define these disorders appear to be chosen or under control of
the will.
Alcohol abuse is perhaps the most important disease of the will. Though
alcoholics are often viewed as having a disease, the classical treatment of
alcoholism requires an appeal to the will.3 3 Similar considerations apply to
disorders such as gambling.3 4  Patients described as having multiple
personalities sometimes have the capacity to bring on a new personality on
demand and, under certain circumstances, appear able to restrain the
appearance of a new personality.3 5 Patients with eating disorders seem to
respond best to situations in which there are clear rewards and
punishments.3 6 Relatively minor shifts in environmental contingencies may
bring about major behavioral changes in these individuals, suggesting that
their capacities to behave more adaptively have always been present. Similar
considerations apply to personality disorders and sexual deviance. The
behavior patterns are certainly difficult to modify over the long term. In the
short run, however, people with personality disorders seem able to control
histrionic or manipulative behavior and people with sexual disorders have the
capacity to refrain from unacceptable sexual conduct most of the time.3 7
Physicians are ambivalent in dealing with patients who can be viewed as
having diseases of the will. When physicians acknowledge the suffering of
these individuals, they often treat them kindly and excuse many of their
behaviors. At the same time, however, physicians never treat these patients
quite as indulgently as other patients. There is a subtle quality of blaming
involved in the approach to treatment and, indeed, treatment is often based
on providing aversive consequences or punishment for the undesired
behavior. Ambivalence about these disorders is sustained further by the
physician's awareness that they often have serious and sometimes fatal
physical consequences and by new knowledge that biological factors may, in
part, cause them.
All of the considerations that apply to the process of excuse-giving with
the physically ill are also relevant to the treatment of those with diseases of
the will. The differences are in the complexity of the problem. In treating
disorders that are partially under control of the will, physicians view the issue
33. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, ALCOHOLISM ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES (1955).
34. See Greenberg, Psychology of Gambling, in 3 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 327 (H.
Kaplan, A. Freedman & B. Sadock eds. 1980).
35. See Taylor & Martin, Multiple Personality, 39J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 281 (1944).
36. Miller, Eating Disorders, in COMPEHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 675, 676 (H.
Adams & P. Sutker eds. 1984).
37. See Adams & Chiodo, Sexual Deviations, in COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
777 (H. Adams & P. Sutker eds. 1984).
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of responsibility as paramount, and excuse-giving must be considered on a
day-to-day or almost hour-to-hour basis. The emphasis on maximizing
personal responsibility may also be somewhat greater.3 8
When we begin to view people who gamble, have deviant sexual
tendencies, or have personality disorders as individuals who may be sick and
should not always be adjudged fully responsible for their actions, it is not a
very large step to apply similar considerations to chronic criminal offenders.
Criminals as a group do not have as many capacities or opportunities as non-
criminals.39 Their assessments of the risks and benefits of criminal action
often favor antisocial conduct and they usually find the choice to behave in a
conforming way to be a difficult one. Some of the difficulty may be related to
social disadvantage and lack of socially acceptable alternatives. Often,
however, biological and psychological incapacities make their choices more
difficult. Many criminals have a defective intellect, learning disorders, or
other minor biological variations that may impair their capacity to develop
constructive alternatives to crime. A variety of genetic or acquired biological
variations or aberrent learning experiences may also impair the capacity of
criminals to assess the risks and benefits of law-abiding versus criminal
conduct in various situations.40 Because there is ample evidence that the
majority of crimes that result in arrest are committed by people who are
intoxicated, it can be asserted that most offenders have, at least, some mental
incapacity at the time of the crime. 41
There may be other reasons for viewing crime as illness. Granting that a
great deal of criminal activity is rational and self-serving, it must also be
acknowledged that much of it is not. Often the criminal takes enormous risks
for negligible benefits and suffers greatly when he is unsuccessful. Crime is
also difficult to distinguish from illness on the basis of the harm it causes
others. The social harm created by some diseases of the will such as
alcoholism or gambling may be no less than those created by many crimes.
Sometimes the same socially harmful behavior is defined as both a mental
disorder and a crime. Exhibitionism, voyeurism, and sexual sadism are
defined as mental disorders in official psychiatric nomenclature. 42 When
individuals are apprehended for engaging in such activities, they are also
viewed as criminals.
The tendency to view crime as illness has a long and controversial history
in modern society. While this view has certainly had its advocates, it has had a
limited impact upon the criminal justice system. In most societies a medical
approach to crime has been rejected because it is believed to foster a model of
38. See Halleck, The Concept of Responsibility in Psychology, 36 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 292, 296-97
(1982).
39. See Glaser, A Review of Crime-Causation Theory and Its Application, in 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE 103
(N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979).
40. See Mednick & Volavka, Biology and Crime, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 116, 116-17 (N. Morris &
M. Tonry eds. 1980).
41. See generally Y. RENNIE, THE SEARCH FOR CRIMINAL MAN (1978).
42. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 271-73 (3d ed. 1980).
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responsibility that is incompatible with societal needs for law and order. It is
also regularly dismissed as an impractical way of dealing with the criminal. 43
Yet, the conceptual framework for viewing criminals as patients exists, and no
scientific premises would be violated if this framework were adopted. The
decision of our society to hold criminal conduct to different standards of
responsibility than behavior during illness is based on perceived societal
needs, not on scientific assessment of the capacities of criminals or patients.
In the next section, the possible advantages of a medical model of excuse-
giving in the criminal justice system will be considered.
VIII
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
One of the major differences between excuse-giving in medicine and in the
criminal justice system is the degree of attention given to individual
capacities. Medicine excuses deviant conduct based on assessments of the
patient's capacities. The criminal justice system pays almost no attention to
differences in capacities among offenders. The mentally defective person and
the genius are equally liable if they forge a check. As noted previously,
psychological, biological, or sociological differences provide an excuse only in
rare instances. The insanity defense is rigidly defined so that the offender is
only excused if he exceeds a threshold of extremely severe impairment. 44
This means that many who are gravely incapacitated are held to the same
standard of blameworthiness as those who are perfectly normal.
Consideration of individual differences sometimes plays a role in sentencing,
but this individualization happens only after blameworthiness has been
determined. Even then, differences in capacities may be ignored in
determining the degree of punishment imposed.4 5
By assessing punishment in a fixed manner, the criminal justice system
also differs from most other systems that impose blame and punishment. In
the medical system a person who is not excused for being sick faces a variety
of internal and external aversive consequences whose intensity may be
modified by the physician. The physician can modify these consequences by
changing the demands put on patients. Patients can also be partially or fully
excused, that is, held responsible for performing some, but not necessarily all,
aspects of a task. The decision to excuse or not excuse can also be rescinded
at any time the patient's capacities change. All such flexibility is lacking in the
criminal justice system where the emphasis is upon the infliction of a specific
degree of pain, usually created by depriving the offender of liberty and
forcing him to live under hard conditions for a relatively precise period of
time.
43. MacNamara, The Medical Model in Corrections, Requiescat in Pace, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 439 (1977).
44. See S. HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED OFFENDER (Forthcoming NIMH Monograph).
45. See L. FORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS 153 (1980).
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Although the retributive needs of society and victims of crime may be
served by fixed sentencing, this practice leaves little room for dealing with
differences in capacities among offenders. Imposing equal or similar prison
sentences upon offenders who have committed the same crime, but who have
different capacities to have chosen otherwise, violates a fundamental sense of
fairness. Furthermore, because offenders are psychologically, sociologically,
and biologically different, imprisonment, the standard form of punishment,
hardly affects all offenders in the same way. The amount of pain inflicted
upon offenders given equal sentences for the same crime can never be
experienced by them as an equal punishment. 46 Three days in prison for one
individual may be as painful as three years for another individual. If they are
both sentenced to three years of imprisonment, the former may suffer more
than a thousandfold the punishment of the latter.
The failure of the Anglo-American criminal justice system to consider
differences in individual capacities in determining blame and punishment can
be viewed as a conceptual and structural flaw, which renders it fundamentally
unjust and inefficient. The current emphasis on retribution and desert
complicates efforts to meet the utilitarian purposes of deterring crime,
protecting society, and rehabilitating offenders. There is little reason to
believe that a system of fixed sentencing efficiently serves the purposes of
deterrence.
Holding those who are gravely impaired to the same standard of
accountability as those who are more generously endowed might, in theory,
discourage all potential offenders. It should, at least, discourage those who
might commit crimes hoping that their impairments would generate leniency.
Research on the deterrent effect of punishment, however, suggests that these
speculations may be irrelevant. 47 It appears that criminals do not dwell on
their own capacities or what will happen to them in the sentencing process
when they commit a crime. Severity of punishment and deterrence do not
appear to be directly correlative. It is probable that offenders are more
significantly influenced by the certainty and swiftness of punishment. 48 In a
democratic society, fixed and severe sentencing initiates complex and lengthy
legal battles that may actually diminish the certainty or celerity of punishment,
eventually diluting the powers of punishment.
Fixed sentencing based on the principle of "just desert" also fails to insure
the restraint of offenders who are at high risk of committing another crime.
Unless sentences are extremely long, many offenders who have served their
sentences will return to the streets with the same impairments that made them
likely candidates for criminal behavior in the first place. Fixed sentencing
leaves no option for dealing with the offender whose capacities change while
in prison so that his risk to society changes.
46. S. HALLECK, supra note 44.
47. See Grasmick & Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 Soc. FORCES
471 (1980).
48. See Pestello, Deterrence: A Reconceptualization, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 593 (1984).
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The current system of criminal justice fails profoundly in the area of
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is given little credence as as goal of criminal
justice.49 A number of studies have suggested that offenders cannot be
rehabilitated (at least under current conditions), and civil libertarians have
argued that the measures taken to rehabilitate offenders, including
indeterminate sentencing, may ultimately be more harmful to them than
being left alone for a fixed period of imprisonment.50 In spite of these
critiques, there is good reason to take the goal of rehabilitation seriously.
Recent data from a variety of sociological and biological disciplines indicate
that a relatively small number of offenders commit a large number of serious
crimes. 51 One response to such data is, of course, to try to identify these
people and monitor them for long periods of time. If such an approach is not
possible, however (and it rarely is), rehabilitation of these offenders emerges
as having a powerful utilitarian value for society. It is likely to be cost efficient
as well as humane. 52
In considering rehabilitation, it is useful to ponder why treatment works so
well in the medical setting but so poorly in the correctional setting. There are
many reasons for this difference, including perhaps some basic differences
between antisocial behavior and other forms of aberrant behavior that are
defined as illnesses, but at least one reason must relate to the emphasis the
criminal justice system puts on retribution. Under a retributive approach
which emphasizes fixed prison terms, the offender has little incentive to
change. If he knows that he faces years of punishment irrespective of possible
behavioral improvement, he can hardly become enthusiastic about re-
habilitation. In addition to feeling resentful for what he usually perceives as
excessive and undeserved punishment, he will feel little sense of responsibility
for shaping his own destiny. This disincentive to change contrasts with the
situation of the patient in medical practice who can modify the excuse-giving
or excuse-withholding response of the physician by exhibiting changed
behavior. Efforts to invoke responsibility based on concepts of retribution
lack the flexibility of similar efforts based on principles of utility. This lack of
flexibility may be a fatal handicap to the goal of rehabilitation in modern
correctional justice.
Ix
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEDICAL MODEL OF EXCUSE-GIVING FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The conceptual framework of medical excuse-giving described in the first
part of this article 53 might influence the criminal justice system in various
ways. One might argue that fundamental fairness requires that responsibility
49. See generally F. CULLEN & K. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982).
50. M. SCHWARTZ, T. CLEAR & L. TRAVIS, CORRECTIONS AND ISSUES APPROACH 194-205 (1980).
51. Wolfgang, Crime in a Birth Cohort, 107 PROC. AM. PHIL. SoC'Y 404 (1973).
52. S. HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER (Forthcoming NIMH Monograph).
53. See supra sections II-VI.
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be ascribed on the basis of an individual's capacities at the time of the crime.
It can be logically argued that if two individuals do not have the same
capacities to refrain from committing a criminal act, they are not equally
responsible for the same act and should receive different degrees of
punishment. While such an approach would be consistent with scientific
principles, it is probably impractical. It would require the consideration of
complex biological, psychological, and sociological factors in every
determination of criminal liability. Excuse-giving would be enormously
expanded but the process would be much more cumbersome than it is in
medicine, since each excuse would have to be litigated under some legal
theory or doctrine. The ordinary trial might become as complicated as a
contested insanity defense trial. Our courts could not tolerate such a burden.
A second approach might be to leave the assessment of capacities to the
judge or jury at the sentencing phase of the trial. To a certain extent such a
system of imposing sentences is in operation now. In the current system,
however, judges or juries rarely take a careful look at the biological,
psychological or social capacities of the individual offender. Nor do they have
a great deal of flexibility in imposing sentences. There is, however, a practical
problem with expanding consideration of individual variations in the
sentencing phase of the trial. To the extent this approach is maximized, the
burdens on the courts would be overwhelming, just as it would be if these
considerations were taken into account at the trial stage. A sentencing
hearing which deals with biological, social, and psychological incapacity could
become as complicated as a trial in which the same factors are considered for
the purpose of determining guilt. 54
There is still one other approach to the management of offenders that
deals with individual differences and also incorporates some aspects of the
medical approach to responsibility. This solution calls for a system of
indeterminate sentencing that allows for confinement and treatment of
offenders, not for a fixed period of time, but rather for as long as they
continue to need treatment and represent a threat to public safety.
Indeterminate sentencing draws heavily on medical principles insofar as it
views criminality as a condition that can be treated. It is also concerned with
societal needs and provides for indefinite restraint of those who appear to be
dangerous. In these respects, it is most similar to the medical model used in
treating the severely mentally ill. This model is somewhat different from that
which has already been described as characterizing other aspects of medical
practice. The emphasis on restraint of those considered dangerous, in either
a system of indeterminate sentencing of criminals or involuntary confinement
of the mentally ill, requires some reconceptualization of the process of
excuse-giving.
It can be argued that the patient who is involuntarily hospitalized for
treatment of mental illness is simply excused from all obligations to function
54. See generally TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PSYCHIATRY IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS (1984).
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in society and that, as he gets better, he is held more responsible for his
conduct. Such a view ignores the possibility that the patient will view his
confinement as punitive, as an aversive consequence deliberately imposed
upon him because of substandard or deviant conduct. The patient may, in
effect, view hospitalization as the result of a failure to be excused. Physicians
try to ignore this view because they have no punitive intentions.
Indeterminate sentencing of offenders, however (which bears many
resemblances to involuntary commitment of mental patients), is not based
entirely on utilitarian principles. When offenders are sentenced to
indeterminate programs, some punishment is intended and past criminal
conduct is not excused. Nor is it likely that the offender will view deprivations
of his liberty as an excuse from meeting current societal obligations.
Furthermore, the severity of the punishment is not tempered by considering
the offender's deficiencies of capacity. Rather, punishment is terminated
when capacities improve and when the offender is judged less dangerous.
Excuses from aversive consequences in an indeterminate sentencing program
begin to exert influence as the offender gets better, not "worse."
Bearing in mind the differences that consideration of the concept of
dangerousness creates in the excuse-giving process, there are still formidable
advantages to the indeterminate model of sentencing in criminology. In such
systems the degree of punishment is based less on desert and proportionality
than on consideration of individual differences. In contrast to a system of
fixed sentencing, offenders know that punishment will be terminated if they
"get better." They can then be held responsible for using all of their
capacities and efforts to change their deviant conduct. Once confined, they
can be held to a much higher standard of responsibility than they would
experience in a model of fixed sentencing. Treatment processes can proceed
as they do in medical practice and the utilitarian model of medical excuse-
giving can be fully utilized.
Indeterminate sentencing, like the medical model that spawned it, has had
only transient periods of popularity in criminal justice. Currently, there are
few indeterminate programs operating in the United States, and the dominant
sentencing philosophy favors fixed and rigid terms of punishment. 55 There
seems to be general agreement that indeterminate programs don't "work."
Whatever the term "work" might mean in this context, there is no evidence
that indeterminate sentencing is any more or less conducive to public safety
than fixed sentencing. Data as to the impact of alternative modes of
sentencing on subsequent crime rates are simply not available. 56
Perhaps the strongest criticism of indeterminate sentencing has focused
upon the needs of the individual offender. Indeterminate sentencing creates
inequities and can compromise the rights of the offender. An individual who
55. Dix, Special Dispositional Alternativesfor Abnormal Offenders: Developments in the Law in MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS 133, 133-36 J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
56. Monahan & Davis, Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS 200
U. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
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spends more time in prison than another who committed the same crime will
perceive himself as being treated unfairly, even if his incarceration is serving a
societal goal of restraint or rehabilitation. This type of inequity is
unavoidable. Whether it is more unjust than the inequities created by fixed
and identical sentencing of individuals with markedly different capacities,
however, is arguable.
The greatest threat of indeterminate sentencing to the civil rights of
offenders is that it puts them at risk of being punished for longer periods of
time than they deserve (under a desert theory) in order to serve societal needs
of restraint or rehabilitation. This risk is similar to the risk of harm imposed
upon the mentally ill who are involuntarily restrained even when they are
undeserving of punishment. 57 These risks can be substantially reduced in
either the criminal justice or mental health system by establishing careful
procedures for judicial monitoring of any period of prolonged restraint. In
the criminal justice system such monitoring is especially important when
incarceration is extended beyond the time the individual would have been
sentenced to serve under a desert model. Harm to offenders could be
minimized if continued restraint were imposed only when convincing proof of
dangerousness was available and when there was strong evidence that the
offender was making progress towards rehabilitation. Another means of
reducing the risk of harm in the criminal justice system is to set maximum
sentences. Under maximum sentences, indeterminancy could be maintained
as a principle that would allow for early release but would not permit
punishment beyond that which is deserved.
Indeterminate sentencing is also criticized for imposing an uncertainty
upon offenders that is overly stressful, and for encouraging them to
manipulate the system by constantly seeking to prove they are not dangerous
and have been rehabilitated. 58 The first of these assertions is simply a
speculation unsupported by data. Perhaps the possibility of early release
would create a kind of hopefulness that would compensate for uncertainties
regarding the exact time of release. The second assertion may be true but it is
hardly a problem. Incarcerated individuals will regularly use a variety of
manipulative methods to gain release. Skilled correctional personnel should
not be deceived by these maneuvers. Furthermore, the efforts of offenders to
portray themselves as "healthy" are not necessarily detrimental to the process
of rehabilitation. Experimenting with a "healthy" role may be a first step
towards desirable behavioral change.5 9
57. N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 35-36 (1971).
58. See generally N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).
59. See generally S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME (1967).
Page 127: Summer 1986]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
X
CONCLUSION
I have presented a series of arguments for moving towards a medical
model of criminal justice based on placing greater emphasis on utilitarian
principles. Implementation of such a model would necessitate increased
reliance on indeterminate rather than fixed sentencing. Although the social
and moral climate of our times opposes such change, I believe that scientific
progress will make it inevitable.
Biomedical research is progressing to a stage where distinctions between
concepts such as mind, brain, or body are no longer as rigid or as certain as
we once thought they were. Persons and minds are changed by altering the
brain. Whether we wish to define that aspect of a person's behavior that is
changed by altering the brain as a disease or as a tendency towards criminal
behavior, the process of change is the same. It is only a matter of time before
new biological methods of treating crime by altering brain chemistry are
available. 60 Some technologies such as anti-androgen treatment of sexual
deviation are already in widespread use.6 1 As newer, more efficient, and safer
technologies develop, pressures for their use in some type of medical
treatment approach will be irresistible.
Those who fear that movement towards a medical model of criminal
justice will minimize our society's commitment to the doctrine of individual
responsibility may be reassured by considering the manner in which
physicians deal with the concept of responsibility. I have argued that in
treating most forms of disease physicians should and, in actuality, probably do
try to maximize responsibility. They do not do this simply because they are
wedded to any philosophical position regarding "just deserts," or the
existence of free will. Rather, they have come to appreciate that whether the
idea of a will is reality or metaphor, appeals to the will have a powerful
influence on behavior. Behavior defined as either "sick" or "bad" is most
likely to change in a socially desirable manner when its perpetrator is held
fully responsible for using all of his capacities to control it. This simple truth
provides a link between science and morality which might foster the
development of new approaches to criminology.
60. Moyer, What is the Potentialfor Biological Violence Control?, in BIOLOGY AND CRIME 18 (C. Jeffrey
ed. 1979).
61. Walker & Meyer, Medroxyprogesterone Acetate Treatment for Paraphilial Sex Offenders, in VIOLENCE
AND THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 353 (. Hans, T. Roberts & K. Solway eds. 1981).
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